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INTRODUCTION
Few areas of legal practice command more popular attention than
criminal law.1 Yet, the manner in which criminal law is taught in law
schools has relatively little to do with preparing students for criminal
practice. Beginning in the 1930s, law schools intentionally reconfigured
their criminal law courses so that students would not become criminal
lawyers. The “honors” of criminal law practice, it was believed, were
“frequently on the dubious side,” not fitting for law students interested in a
respectable career and a superior “social position.”2
The first law school to move away from training criminal lawyers
was Columbia.3 Spurred by a sharp “decline in employment” at private
law firms during the Great Depression, Columbia administrators modified
their criminal law offering, hoping to use the class as a means of preparing
students not for criminal practice but for the “phenomenal increase in
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1
One need only reference a small sampling of the number of television shows dedicated
to criminal law. See, e.g., Law & Order, Law & Order Special Victims Unit, Boston
Legal, Shark, and JAG, to name a few.
2
George W. Stumberg, Book Review, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1123 (1941)(reviewing JEROME
MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1940));
ARTHUR L. WOOD, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER 39-40 (1967).
3
JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 325
(1955).

governmental functions,” and rapidly increasing “demand for competent
lawyers” in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.4
Though the New Deal ended in 1939, the casebook that came out
of Columbia’s criminal law course went on to revolutionize criminal law
teaching in the United States. Co-authored by Columbia Law Professors
Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, Criminal Law and its
Administration became the first law school casebook to successfully
synthesize social science materials with cases, inspiring a generation of
criminal law teachers to organize their courses along similar lines.5
Sanford H. Kadish, to take just one influential example, modeled his 1962
Criminal Law & Its Processes after Wechsler, spawning a wave of similar
texts in the 1960s and 1970s.6 As late as May 2008, Kadish – remaining

4

GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 325. A similar phenomenon happened at Yale. See LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, 182 (1986) [hereinafter KALMAN,
REALISM].
5
According to Laura Kalman, Wechsler and Michael’s Criminal Law and Its
Administration was the first casebook that successfully “integrated law with the social
sciences.” KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 4, at 90. Earlier attempts had been made by
Albert Jacobs, Karl Llewellyn, William O. Douglas, and Felix Frankfurter but, according
to Kalman, they did not stray far from the Langdellian model. Id. at 78-79, 85-86, 88.
Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler completed the first unpublished version of their
casebook for the private use of Columbia University law students in 1935. See Jerome
Michael & Herbert Wechsler, Cases and Materials in Criminal Law and Its
Administration (1935) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Arthur W. Diamond Law
Library, Columbia University). The formal casebook was published in 1940. HERBERT
WECHSLER AND JEROME MICHAEL, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CASES,
STATUTES, COMMENTARIES (1940) [herinafter MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW].
6
Interview with Sanford H. Kadish, Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of
Law, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, in Berkeley, California (May 19,
2008) (on file with the author). Monrad Paulsen and Sanford Kadish credited Wechsler
directly in their 1962 casebook: MONRAD G. PAULSEN AND SANFORD H. KADISH,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (1st ed. 1962). Kadish,
Schulhofer, and Steiker still cite to Wechsler in what is now the 8th edition of the
casebook, SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (8th ed. 2007). Joshua Dressler credits Wechsler through
Kadish. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed.
2004). Other casebooks that follow the Wechsler and Michael approach include
CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005);
MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES,
STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND
CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG, GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2004); RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN,
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L
WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E.
DIX AND M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (3rd
ed. 2001). Even Rollin Perkins has conceded “the modern dominance of statutes,” and
included extensive notes with editorial comments and citations to law reviews, see
RONALD N. BOYCE, DONALD A. DRIPPS AND ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE (9th ed. 2004).
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true to Wechsler’s vision – asserted that his book, even in its eighth
edition, was not designed for “training legal practitioners.”7
Taking the Depression-Era beginnings of criminal law at Columbia
as a starting point, this article takes a closer look at the history of the
criminal law course, using previously unexamined primary sources to
illustrate that the class is animated by a doubly subversive aim. Not only
did Wechsler and Michael reorient criminal law away from the
practitioner, but they organized it in such a manner as to undermine the
case method itself.
Convinced that the Langdellian method had
contributed to the Supreme Court’s destruction of early New Deal
programs by fostering a view of the law as a “closed-system,” Michael
and Wechsler hoped to disrupt Langdell’s legacy and open students’ eyes
to law’s interrelationship with society, revolutionizing law teaching in the
process.8 Whereas Langdell’s disciples simply had students read cases,
for example, Wechsler and Michael substituted cases for outside materials
and editorial comments, including normative questions like whether
certain offenses were “objectionable,” whether it was ever “justifiable” to
kill a nonviolent offenders, and whether European codes were more
“wise” than American ones.9
That Wechsler and Michael sought to revolutionize law teaching
by making criminal law a vehicle for challenging the case method is not a
subject that legal historians have explored.10 Yet, its implications are
potentially profound. Every year, thousands of law students graduate
thinking that they have studied criminal law using the case method, when
they have not. Every year, the same law students graduate thinking that
they have been trained for criminal practice, when they have not. At a
time when law schools are confronting mounting pressure to increase the
practical nature of their first year curricula, the history of criminal law
might provide a clue into how certain courses became more theoretical,
and whether this trend is worth reversing.11
7

Interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with Herbert Wechsler, Professor,
Columbia University School of Law, in New York City, N.Y. (August 11, 1978;
February 23, 1979; March 12 &13, 1982), [hereinafter Wechsler, Interview]
8
Id.
9
MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 145, 201, 224. For
descriptions of Langdell’s method, see KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 5, at 1-26; Howard
Schweber, Before Langdell: The Roots of American Legal Science in THE HISTORY OF
LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES,
VOL. II 613, 632 (Steve Sheppard, ed., 1999).
10
In one of the most careful studies of legal education in the United States to date, Laura
Kalman concludes that Langdell’s “method” remained dominant despite the rise of legal
realism. KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 4, at 229.
11
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
Reassessments of first year curricula did not begin with the Carnegie Report. See e.g.
Jonathan D. Glater, Harvard Law Decides to Steep Students in 21st Century Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006. The report has appeared to fuel the debate, however, over whether
the first year should be modified. See e.g. Dean Claudio Grossman, Address at the
Innovations in the First Year Curriculum Conference, American University’s Washington
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Further, recovering the hidden history of criminal law might enable
us to better assess the status of the case method generally in American
legal education. For example, even a cursory comparison of the average
Twenty-First Century criminal law casebook with Joseph Henry Beale’s
1894 text suggests that Langdell’s method, at least in the criminal law
context, is dead. Though modern casebooks appear to focus on cases, few
use more than two cases to illustrate a legal point, few require that
students be able to distinguish between more than three cases, and none
create the impression that learning legal rules from briefing cases is
sufficient for mastering criminal law.12 Instead, criminal law casebooks
push students to consider the philosophical, social, and moral implications
of criminalization, punishment, and crime itself, transforming the class
into what Sanford Kadish has called “almost liberal arts.”13
To further illustrate the pedagogical and political ramifications of
Michael and Wechsler’s innovation in the criminal law course, this article
will proceed in four parts. Part I will return to the Langdellian case
method, showing how Harvard Professor and Langdell protégé Joseph
Henry Beale utilized the method in his popular 1894 criminal law
casebook. Part II will show how Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael
reacted to “Bealeism” by reinventing the criminal law course in the
1930s.14 Part III will discuss initial responses to Wechsler and Michael’s
approach, showing how scholars suspicious of criminal practitioners
embraced it. Part IV will trace the dramatic rise of the Wechslerian
method in American law schools from the 1940s through the 1990s,
showing how Michael and Wechsler’s tendency to de-emphasize cases led
to a new kind of casebook that transformed criminal law.

I. JOSEPH HENRY BEALE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW CASE METHOD
In 1894, a young law professor named Joseph Henry Beale, Jr.
assembled a textbook that covered the core subjects of criminal law by
referring almost entirely to cases.15 To those who knew the author, a
professor at Harvard Law School, this was no surprise.16 Beale was a
College of Law (March 21, 2008); Katharine Mangan, “A Plea for Real-World Training
in Law Schools,” CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Jan. 19, 2007.
12
See supra note 6.
13
Kadish, Interview, supra note 6.
14
Jerome Frank coined the term “Bealism.” See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 55 (1930).
15
JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR. A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES UPON
CRIMINAL LAW (1894) [hereinafter BEALE, CASES]. For Beale’s dominance in the early
years of the Twentieth Century, see E.W. Puttkammer, Book Review, 8. U. CHI. L. REV.
386 (1941) (reviewing JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW & ITS
ADMINISTRATION (1940).
16
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION 92-99 (1994).
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“theologian of the law” who had never worked as a lawyer but was deeply
influenced by Christopher Columbus Langdell’s theory that legal
principles could be found, classified, and organized simply by reading
reported cases.17
In his preface, Beale made it clear that the cases he had selected
were “chiefly intended for the use of classes in schools,” and that in order
for students to “get the benefit” of studying them it was necessary to
“omit” either commentary or head notes.18 Instead, Beale made his
students sift through relatively large numbers of cases from different
jurisdictions to distill, as best they could, basic criminal law principles.19
He divided his casebook into twenty-two chapters, the first eleven
covering what might be considered the general part of the criminal law,
“the criminal act,” the “criminal intent,” “justification,” as well as
procedural considerations like “the indictment,” “former conviction or
acquittal,” and “criminal procedure.”20
The last eleven chapters,
conversely, included specific offenses like larceny, embezzlement, false
pretences, conspiracy, and nuisance.21
For each topic, no matter whether general or specific, Beale
included anywhere from six to nine cases. To take just one example, he
covered the specific offense of voluntary manslaughter by assigning eight
cases and nothing else. The first case, drawn from England, held that
words alone could not constitute provocation but, if words led to combat
“betwixt two upon a sudden heat,” then any ensuing death could be
charged as manslaughter.22 In the next case, a defendant was impressed
into “the Majesty’s service” without a valid warrant, leading several men
to come to his rescue, killing a police officer in the process.23 Reluctant to
offer “encouragement” to “private men to take upon themselves to be the
assertors of other men’s liberties” the Court held that the killing was
murder, not manslaughter.24 In the remaining six cases, all drawn from
English courts, students were required to actively consider different
applications of the principle of provocation, all arising from slightly
different factual scenarios, including throwing a pickpocket into an

17

Id. Felix Frankfurter referred to Beale, one of his old professors, as a “theologian of
the law.” Felix Frankfurter, Joseph Henry Beale, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 701, 702 (1943). See
also STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 92-96 (2000).
18
BEALE, CASES supra note 15, at Preface (no page delineated).
19
Beale praised Langdell’s pedagogical approach in an article written for the New York
University Law Quarterly Review in 1931. See Joseph H. Beale, Langdell, Gray, Thayer
and Ames: Their Contribution to the Study and Teaching of Law 8 N.Y.U. L. Q. R. 385
(1931)[hereinafter Beale, Langdell].
20
BEALE, CASES supra note 15, at vii.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 473.
23
Id. at 474.
24
Id.
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“adjoining pond,” stabbing a woman in the back after she delivered a “box
on the ear” and killing a constable in response to an “illegal” arrest.25
In none of the scenarios did Beale provide any commentary or
outside sources. Nor did he mention any statute. Instead, he presented the
students with cases that collectively illustrated classic common law
examples of provocation, meanwhile providing some sense of the limits of
those rules. From a pedagogical perspective, the section provided students
with an active opportunity to learn legal rules by deriving them from
factual scenarios, without getting into a critical discussion of why those
rules existed.
Even when Beale did include non-case materials, they invariably
constituted ruminations on what the common law was, not what it should
be. Perhaps foremost among his outside sources was William Hawkins’s
A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown.26 Hawkins’s Treatise did not
encourage students to think critically about whether the common law
should be changed, but sought simply to illustrate what it said. For
example, Beale introduced the crime of murder by including an excerpt
from Hawkins explaining the evolution of the offense from one that
initially punished towns for failing to produce the killer of a “Dane,” to a
general crime applicable to anyone who killed an “Englishman” with
“malice prepense.”27 Immediately following the excerpt, Beale included
six cases.28
In the first case, the court held that if a constable “or any of his
assistants” were killed during an attempt to suppress “an affray” then the
killer was guilty of murder, whether he intended to kill the party or not.29
In the next case, the court held that even if a private citizen attempted to
break up a domestic dispute, the accidental killing of that citizen by one of
the disputing parties could be considered murder, provided that the killer
had “notice” of the victim’s intent.30 For the next three cases, Beale
presented similar situations where malice could be implied. They
included an instance where an employer used a “bar of iron” to discipline
a servant; a father set fire to a house with his retarded son inside, and a
killer shot at a man on horseback but mistakenly hit a bystander.31 By the
final case in the series, students were well versed in the principle that
malice could be inferred in cases where the defendant committed an

25

Id, at 477-87.
Id. at 461, citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN OR A
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLE MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT (1824).
27
Id. According to Hawkins, the original crime of murder in England was enacted by
King Canute simply to save the lives of Danes, not Englishmen. If a Dane was killed, the
“the town or hundred where the fact was done was to be amerced to the king.” Id.
28
BEALE, CASES supra note 15, at 462-471.
29
Id. at 462.
30
Id. at 462.
31
Id. at 463-469.
26
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“intentional” deadly act without facing “impending peril to life or
member” or some kind of legitimate “provocation.”32
To further elaborate on the differences between murder and
manslaughter, Beale included no less than nine more cases. Again, each
case provided students with a relatively clear example of a legal rule. First
degree murder required premeditated and deliberate design.33 Second
degree murder included provocation by words alone.34 Manslaughter
applied when death was the result of either legitimate provocation or
accidental killing.35
What might students have learned from such an approach?
Clearly, they learned how to read and organize relatively large groupings
of cases, six to nine being common to cover one particular topic, a number
that provided students with a framework from within which to assess a
wide range of factual scenarios. By excluding extraneous notes and
outside sources, Beale pushed students to learn the law much as they
would if they were alone in a library at a law firm, going through hundreds
of cases to determine the contours of a legal rule.
As Beale himself remembered it, the case method marked a
dramatic shift away from passive learning, the process of simply “hearing
and reading the knowledge of a teacher” and towards a more active
approach in which the student “gains” knowledge “for himself, first hand,
from the sources.”36 Though such an approach may not be as “formally
correct as that received from a master” noted Beale, it made a deeper
impression on students, remained longer in their memories, even to the
point of becoming “part of [their] mental fiber.”37 The value of the case
method, in other words, was that it was a type of practical, active learning,
a learning best facilitated through the assignment of relatively large
numbers of cases for students to work through alone.38
In addition to its pedagogic value, Beale’s approach had a certain
political aspect as well. By presenting students with nothing but cases,
many dating back to sixteenth and seventeenth century England, Beale
created an image of the common law as an authoritative source of legal
rules, something to be revered rather than reformed. Even cases that
begged for statutory reform, like the imputation of malice for accidental
killings, for example, marshaled a certain respect in Beale’s universe
simply because they derived from the common law.
Beale’s celebration of the common law made him Langdellian.
Like Christopher Columbus Langdell, who introduced the case method to
Harvard in 1870, Beale instilled in his students an impression of the law as
32

Id. at 470.
Id. at 472.
34
Id. at 474.
35
Id. at 474-487.
36
Beale, Langdell, supra, note 19, at 386.
37
Id.
38
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S, 54-5 (1983).
33
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something derived not from immutable, natural law principles, but actual,
real world cases.39 In Langdell’s mind, students should be given the
impression that law was a “logically coherent system of technical rules”
that were to be learned from a positive rather than a normative
standpoint.40 Indeed, Langdell believed strongly that the “chief business
of a lawyer” was to “learn and administer the law as it is” not as it “ought
to be.”41 Even judges should not be engaged in raw policy-making but
bound by the common law rule of precedent, discouraged from exercising
any kind of radical, reformist impulse.
Langdell’s approach coincided nicely with a variety of prevailing
educational, political and economic trends in the United States during the
latter years of the Nineteenth Century. Thanks to the Civil War, which
brought an “abrupt and violent conclusion” to professional faith in natural
law, Langdell’s emphasis on judicial positivism provided a welcome
respite.42 Pedagogically, it provided a sophisticated counterpoint to the
recitation of legal rules, the primary methodology in the earliest, most
primitive law schools.43 It also provided an alternative to the law office
apprenticeship, perhaps the most popular means of becoming a lawyer in
the Nineteenth Century.44
Even more importantly, Langdell’s anti-contextual approach
coincided nicely with the rise of the industrial revolution. As industry
boomed in the final years of the Nineteenth Century, the Supreme Court of
the United States found itself in the midst of innumerable disputes over
whether democratic majorities had the power to regulate private
industry.45 Reluctant to impede economic growth, the Court adopted a
formalist adherence to presumably fundamental doctrines of liberty of
contract and due process, doctrines that it deftly used to strike down wave
after wave of regulatory legislation.46 Whether Langdell anticipated the
rise of this formalism or not, his decision to assign cases, and cases only,
complemented the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence by instilling in students
a respect for private law-ordering along with a concomitant contempt for
legislative intervention in the business arena.
The Court’s contempt for public law, the apotheosis of which
emerged in Lochner v. New York in 1905, sparked dissent in the legal
academy.47 In 1915, for example, future Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter argued that the “growing legislative activity of our time”
should guide law schools in revising their curricula, moving them away
from strict adherence to the case method and toward a more normative,
39

FELDMAN, supra note 17 at 93; KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 4, at 10-12.
LAPIANA, supra note 16, at 78.
41
LAPIANA, supra note 16, at 77.
42
FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 86.
43
Id. at 47.
44
Id. at 48.
45
Schweber, supra note 9, at 632.
46
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 472 (2001).
47
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 4 (1905).
40
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policy-oriented approach.48 Animating Frankfurter’s pleas were at least
two factors: the need for public regulation of rapidly expanding, injuryproducing, and sometimes irresponsible private industries, coupled with
the inability of the courts and the private bar to respond proactively to
large-scale regulatory problems. Noting that courts were “already
laboring under too heavy a pressure,” and that private lawyers were
“overworked” and too “absorbed” in resolving cases to think
“consciously” and “systematically” about meeting the demands of a
rapidly industrializing mass society, Frankfurter identified “teachers of the
law” as the “natural” candidates for arriving at solutions to some of the
Progressive era’s most tenacious legal problems.49
Frankfurter also called for the production of a new type of law
student. “It is not enough that young men should come from our schools
equipped to become skillful practitioners,” he argued, “[w]e must show
them the law as an instrument,” something that can be used “for human
betterment” and not simply a tool in the hands of “clever pleaders.”50
Though Frankfurter did not go so far as to assert that the case method be
abandoned, he alluded to it negatively, noting that students should no
longer be taught that law was simply a “Procrustean bed” of precedent
“into which all persons and all societies must inexorably be fitted.”51
Such words decried both the strict adherence to common law cases that
Langdell and Beale advocated, as well as the type of deductive logic that
they sought to instill in their students, a logic that, in Frankfurter’s words,
simply applied “old ideas to new facts.”52 Instead, Frankfurter called for
“new premises to fit present needs,” and an inductive approach to solving
legal problems by “assimilating social and economic facts” to cast light on
“new conditions.”53 These were progressive words, both in the sense that
they sought to link legal education to the larger goals of socially-conscious
Progressive-Era reformers, and also in the manner that they questioned
strict adherence to the Langdellian case method as sufficient preparation
for legal practice.
Others agreed. In 1923 Columbia Law School Dean Harlan Fiske
Stone declared that while the case method was helpful in negotiating “the
jungle of judicial decisions,” law professors should not approach legal
teaching as simply “a hermetically sealed compartment.”54 Instead, they
should look to the “social and economic forces” which gave law its “form
and substance.”55 No historical event brought this lesson home more
poignantly than the Great Depression. Sparked by a stock market crash in
48

Felix Frankfurter, The Law and the Law Schools, 1 A. B. A. J. 532 (1915).
Id. at 533.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Harlan Fiske Stone, Some Phases of Legal Education in America, 58 AM. L. REV. 747
(1923).
55
Id.
49
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1929, the Depression led to massive disruptions in employment,
productivity, and consumer confidence, pushing national leaders like
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to develop public law solutions to what seemed
a massive, nation-threatening, private sector debacle.
Interestingly, the nation’s plunge into economic depression
following the crash of 1929 had an unexpected impact on law school
curricula, particularly course offerings at elite New England schools
accustomed to preparing graduates for corporate practice.56 As Columbia
University law professor Julius Goebel remembered it, the “decline of
employment by law offices due to the rigors of the Great Depression,”
coupled with the “phenomenal increase in governmental functions” during
the New Deal, made it “urgent” that the school begin to train students in
“public law.”57 This need led Columbia to hire a promising young
graduate and former Goebel research fellow named Herbert Wechsler, a
proponent of the New Deal who would come to have a remarkable impact
on the teaching of criminal law.

II. WECHSLER & MICHAEL RESPOND TO BEALE
Herbert Wechsler, who graduated from Columbia in 1931 in the
midst of a Depression-ravaged job market, brought with him his own
reasons for upsetting the case method. Like many young scholars at the
time, Wechsler believed that the Great Depression had been caused by
problems inherent to laissez faire economics, not least of them
unregulated banking, an un-policed stock exchange, and an overconfidence in market forces that collectively made a mockery of the
formalist premise that economic affairs were best managed through the
private adjudication of legal disputes. The case method, which focused on
judicial adjudication and therefore perpetuated what Roscoe Pound called
the common law’s “antipathy to legislation,” denigrated state regulation as
a lesser form of lawmaking – if not an outright intrusion into fundamental
rights of property and contract.58 As law’s old guard clung to Langdell in
the midst of the howling 1930s, Wechsler began to view the case method
as limiting, even dangerous. Not surprisingly, he turned to earlier thinkers
who had long called for curricular reform, law teachers like Felix
Frankfurter among them.59
56

GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 325.
Id., at 315, 325.
58
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract 18 YALE L. J. 454, 462 (1909).
59
See e.g., Frankfurter, Law Schools, supra note 48. Interestingly, Wechsler’s
relationship with Frankfurter lent more than just intellectual support to his decision to
break from the case method and produce a different type of lawyer. Thanks to
connections that he had with the Roosevelt administration, Frankfurter became a “oneman employment agency” for recent law graduates interested in working for federal New
Deal agencies. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945 (1999), 121. Though he would later become more
57
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To Herbert Wechsler and his senior colleague Jerome Michael,
Frankfurter provided theoretical ammunition for fighting the nation’s
frightening plunge into economic recession, a recession accelerated by
doctrinal formalism. Frankfurter’s conviction that students should be
taught that law is “an instrument” to be used for “human betterment”
impressed them; as did Frankfurter’s support for President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.60 Both Wechsler and Michael proudly
endorsed Roosevelt, standing out as two of only five “New Dealers” on
Columbia’s law faculty at the time.61 When the Supreme Court began
striking down New Deal programs like the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration and the National Industrial Recovery Act on what they
believed were overtly formalist, “closed system” grounds, both Wechsler
and Michael placed at least some blame at the feet of the case method for
producing an isolated, politically unresponsive judiciary.62 As Wechsler
later remembered it, the Court possessed no “receptivity to statutory
changes of the common law,” lacked any “sympathetic treatment of
administrative agencies,” and clung desperately to the notion of the
common law as a “closed system,” a position that deserved “unqualified
disdain.”63
Rather than view law as a closed system, Wechsler came to view it
in more “utilitarian” terms, an instrument of “statecraft” that could be used
to pull the country out of its fiscal woes.64 Before this could happen,
however, lawyers and law students needed to learn to think about the law
differently; as a tool for change and not a prophylactic to state intervention
and control.65 Wechsler distilled these notions into four separate “articles
of faith” that guided his legal career.66 They included: 1) a rejection of the
common law as a “closed system,” 2) an emphasis on “judicial receptivity
to statutory changes of the common law,” 3) a presumption that “legal
understanding is imperfectly obtained” and, 4) an “unqualified disdain”
for the Supreme Court’s formalist destruction of New Deal programs
“despite the magnitude of the abuse and dislocation incident to the
development of an industrial society.”67
Wechsler let his “articles of faith” guide his selection of materials
for teaching criminal law. Not offered at Columbia prior to Wechsler’s
arrival on the faculty in 1931, criminal law had been virtually ignored due
to the fact that it was “generally thought to have no money in it” and was
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therefore “not interesting” to most “bread-and-butter” students.68
Precisely for this reason, Wechsler saw teaching the course as an
“opportunity” for him to put his philosophical and political assumptions
into practice.69
Frustrated with what he perceived to be a disconnect between
law’s political underpinnings and the apolitical nature of the case method,
Wechsler joined his colleague Jerome Michael in putting together a
different kind of criminal law casebook in 1934. In thinking about what to
include, Wechsler later remembered that he sought to assemble
“pedagogical materials” that “invited cogitation outside the closed
system.”70 The “closed system” in his opinion, was what Langdell
advanced, namely a notion that the “whole process of learning,
understanding, [and] applying the law was a process of uncovering the
leading cases” and through a process of “logical deduction” applying them
to “new situations.”71 To Wechsler, such a “closed” method had
contributed to the Supreme Court’s early, anti-New Deal stance. Instead
of focusing on the “closed system” of the common law then, which
provided “no room for legislative or quasi-legislative judgment,”
Wechsler turned instead to a much more open system of legal pedagogy,
one that incorporated a variety of materials and posed a variety of
questions.72 Intent on getting students to think about legislation as an
important mode of legal action, Wechsler assembled his casebook so as
not to simply require that students “distill the law” from reading cases, but
rather ponder “interesting questions” like: “what are the consequences of
this or the other type of formulation or norm?” “How can we find out
something about consequences?” And “how can we face up candidly to
value choices?”73 Such questions, believed Wechsler, constituted a
“wholly different way of thinking about the law” than the earlier
“Langdellian way.”74
To provide a taste of Wechsler’s approach, it is helpful to compare
his casebook’s section on voluntary manslaughter with that of Joseph
Henry Beale. Unlike Beale, who assigned a total of eight full cases for
students to read on the subject, Wechsler assigned one. The case, Regina
v. Welsh, was one that Beale had included in his casebook and originated
from England in 1869. It involved a defendant who had taken his future
victim to court for reclamation of a debt only to find the claim repudiated
by a judge.75 Angry over his defeat, the defendant went to a “public
house” or bar, where he met his future victim, who ridiculed him for
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failing to secure the debt.76 Enraged, the defendant approached the victim
(who put up his hand in defense), and then stabbed him with a “clasp
knife,” killing him on the spot.77 Desperate to have his charge of murder
reduced to manslaughter, the defendant tried to claim that he acted “under
the influence of passion,” only to have the court rule that provocation must
be such as would excite “the mind of a reasonable man” and that “mere
words” did not suffice, nor did “putting” out one’s hand in defense, as the
victim seemed to do when the defendant approached him.78
For Beale, that was all that students needed to know.79 Compared
to the case where the defendant had actually been in combat, Welsh did
not constitute grounds for provocation, nor could it be synthesized with
the case where the defendant was pick-pocketed and threw his thief into an
“adjoining pond,” gaining the provocation defense.80 If anything, Welsh
bore distinct similarities to the defendant who had stabbed a woman in the
back for boxing him on the ear.81
Such doctrinal distinctions formed only a small part of Wechsler’s
analysis. Throughout the case he included footnotes that referred to law
review articles and commission reports, even describing the evolution of
the doctrine in the United States over the course of the Nineteenth and
early Twentieth Centuries.82 Immediately following the case, Wechsler
included a series of “Notes” that included brief summaries of several cases
along with North Dakota’s statutory prohibition against infanticide, an
excerpt from Bentham’s “Theory of Legislation,” an excerpt from
Holmes’s “Common Law,” and a statute from India.
What might students have learned from such materials? The brief
notes on cases were probably designed to perform a function similar to
Beale’s full cases. Each one presented a slightly different factual take on
the provocation rule, including a defendant whose girlfriend had confessed
to having had an affair, a defendant who hit a neighbor’s wife with an axe
after a dispute over a property line, and a defendant who shot a police
officer in order to resist an unlawful arrest.83 The other materials,
however, particularly the excerpts from Bentham and Holmes, aimed at a
different target.
Bentham’s selection, for example, argued that
punishments should not be reduced for cases where passions were high,
but rather should be increased to “exceed the advantage of the offence.”84
Precisely because people were more prone to commit offenses while under
“the heat of passion,” in other words, the punishment should be “even
more an object of dread” than in cases where the defendant was operating
76

Id.
Id.
78
Id., at 149.
79
BEALE, CASES, supra note 15, at 473.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id., at 149-50.
83
Id. at, 151-4.
84
Id., at 158.
77

12

rationally.85 Clearly such a proposition invited debate over the value of
the provocation defense, including why it should be allowed at all. This
was something that Beale’s text did not do. Nor did Beale cite Holmes,
who noted that if the “object of punishment is prevention” then
punishments should be more severe in cases of “great excitement.”86 At
least twice, in other words, Wechsler included materials that tested the
wisdom behind the common law rule, in addition to requiring students to
learn the rule. Following his case notes, for example, Wechsler provided
discussion questions that included queries like: “Do you agree with
Bentham?” and “What justification is there for making criminal homicides
which are provoked?”87
If nothing else, here was a relatively dramatic shift away from the
pedagogical theory originally envisioned by either Beale or Langdell.
Though Wechsler and Michael incorporated cases into their text, for
example, at least half of their materials were designed not to drive home
the basic principles of the common law, so much as to engender debate
about what that law, ultimately, should be. From one perspective, such an
approach might be viewed as a type of refutation of the common law, an
approach to teaching which presumed that the law could be changed and
should be changed based not on deducing eternal principles from past
cases but rather thinking critically about the law’s function in every day
life. This type of legal education aimed to create a very different type of
lawyer, if you will, than Langdell’s method. Instead of an attorney who
revered the presumably timeless principles of the common law, or even
one who simply limited their professional goals to the representation of
clients, Wechsler and Michael’s method favored, if not presumed that
students would become active players in the legislative process. In certain
ways, Wechsler was preparing students to become enlightened leaders
whose knowledge of the law would carry directly into public service.

III. EARLY REACTIONS TO THE CASEBOOK
Wechsler and Michael’s casebook did not go unnoticed. In 1941,
University of Texas law professor George Wilfred Stumberg reviewed the
work, commending the two Columbia law professors for doing more than
simply updating Beale. In Stumberg’s opinion, Michael and Wechsler had
raised “a timely question” as to the “purposes that can and should be
served by American law schools in giving a course in criminal law.”88
85
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Noting that “relatively few law-school graduates practice criminal law”
Stumberg downplayed the need for instilling “technical knowledge” about
the criminal process.89 In fact, he even went so far as to argue that the
“ambitious law graduate” should not be “blamed for shunning the criminal
courts” a “not very nice” place where success hinged more on being
“sharp-witted” than “learned.”90
Convinced that law schools would be better off dropping criminal law
than offering a course on the nuts and bolts of practice, Stumberg
maintained that the course should be used to fulfill “greater obligations.”91
Such obligations, in his opinion, included training students to think about
the “long range social considerations” of criminal law policy, not to
mention the contributions of “criminologists” and “psychiatrists” to
understanding why crime occurred and how law might be used to control
it.92 Unimpressed by criminal practitioners, who Stumberg believed were
“preoccupied with their day to day tasks” and limited in their
understanding of “positive law,” the Texas professor approved Michael
and Wechsler’s attempt to go beneath the “surface” and make students
think critically about the “law in action.”93
It was a remarkable review, not only for its overwhelming support of
Wechsler and Michael’s text, but for the insight that it cast on the
pedagogical and professional context of teaching criminal law at the time.
For example, Stumberg made it relatively clear that the practice of
criminal law was not something that most law students in Texas aspired to
do, nor was it something that they should aspire to do. Indeed, he seemed
to desire that criminal law teachers not even try to encourage their students
to go into criminal law, something that was a poor choice for “bright
young” men “with an eye to profit and social position.”94 Whether
Stumberg worried that criminal lawyers would not match the alumni
contributions of students who entered “offices whose clients do not carry
even the slightest scent of the jail” is uncertain, yet he clearly did not see
criminal practice to be a worthy occupation for University of Texas
graduates.95
Interestingly, just as Stumberg seemed adamant about discouraging
students from criminal practice, so too did he express enthusiasm for using
criminal law as a vehicle for getting them to think like policy makers.96
Evidence of this emerged in Stumberg’s closing paragraph where he
praised Wechsler and Michael for transforming criminal law into a method
for encouraging students to engage in “social thinking” not personal
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“interest.”97 “If this emphasis on [social thinking] is unsound,” he noted,
for example, then “the shouting of these last years about ‘social
engineering’ has been unsound.”98 What Stumberg meant by “shouting”
about social engineering was not clear. It is possible that he was referring
to the work of social scientists like Thorstein Veblen, who posited that
governmental institutions could, with the help of scientific means, be used
to alter mass behavior.99 Yet, Veblen had begun publishing such ideas as
early as 1919, long before Wechsler’s casebook.100 What did the recent
“shouting” refer to? One possibility is that Stumberg was responding to a
surge of scholarly interest in the late 1930s focusing on the manner in
which mass culture and governmental institutions could change social
behavior, including criminal behavior, on a mass level. Much of this
thinking came out of Germany’s Frankfurt School, an institution founded
by scholars like Theodore Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, and Max Horkheimer
in the 1920s.101 To them, mass culture created a variety of opportunities
for influencing large numbers of people, not always for the better.102
Adorno, for example, studied the manner in which popular culture led to
the creation of something he called the “authoritarian personality” a theory
that drew inspiration from the rise of the National Socialist Party in
Germany in the 1930s.103 Indeed by the time the Nazis seized power in
Germany in 1933, much of the Frankfurt School had fled to the U.S.,
many ending up at the Institute for Social Research at Columbia
University.104
One member of the Frankfurt school who ended up at Columbia and
became interested in criminal law pedagogy was Otto Kirchheimer.
Kirchheimer, who focused on penal institutions, spent time at Columbia
rewriting George Rusche’s Punishment and Social Structure, a pioneering
text examining the roles that prisons played in modern society, not simply
as penal institutions but buttresses to the class structure.105 In his own
work, Kirchheimer explored tensions between pragmatic and theoretical
approaches to sentencing, as well as the possibilities of using prison for
rehabilitative ends. In a testament to his influence, Wechsler and Michael
cited Kirchheimer twice in their casebook, once to support the notion that
retribution might be justified “unless the retributive purpose is deemed to
97
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be authoritative,” a classic Frankfurt School theme, and also to suggest
that prisons were rarely reformative institutions.106
Though it is unlikely that Wechsler or Michael saw themselves as critical
theorists of the Frankfurt School variety, their citations to Kirchheimer
suggest that they were aware of the School’s critical work. In fact,
Kirchheimer himself gave Wechsler a remarkably positive review in
1941.107 Noting that criminal law could be structured in at least two ways,
either as a course in how to “draw the boundary line” between criminal
and non-criminal conduct, or as a “broader” inquiry involving the
“integration of law and social science,” Kirchheimer praised Michael and
Wechsler for pursuing the latter.108 In particular, Kirchheimer lauded
Michael and Wechsler’s inclusion of “extra-legal” material, or readings
that fleshed out the “political and social conditions under which rules arise
and are constantly reshaped.”109 Such an approach, he argued, represented
nothing less than a “pioneering work” in the “art” of teaching criminal
law.110
Not all scholars agreed. To Chicago Law Professor and Beale successor
E. W. Puttkammer, the “enormous” amount of “nonlegal” material that
Wechsler and Michael cited made their casebook “as much of a reference
work” as a “teaching tool.”111 In fact, Puttkammer even lamented that
Wechsler and Michael had not published the casebook as a reference text,
noting that it was “almost appalling by its sheer length” and a better fit for
the reference “category.”112 Others who doubted the wisdom of
incorporating social science materials to the extent that Wechsler and
Michael did included legal giant and one-time reformer Roscoe Pound.
“[C]riminology and penal methods should be put in graduate courses for
teachers and administrative officials,” wrote Pound, not courses aimed at
law students who have “more than enough to do in learning the lawyer’s
technique.” 113 “The need,” that law schools faced, continued Pound in a
conservative mood, was not to train administrators but “to give competent
fundamental training in criminal law to those who are to take part as
counsel, prosecutors and judges.”114 Taking “part” as counselors and
judges meant training practitioners, not the kind of federal administrative
attorneys that Herbert Wechsler had in mind. Indeed, Pound seemed to
think that Wechsler’s type of training would actually harm “first-year law
106
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students” by instilling in them “wrong ideas” about criminal practice that
would be difficult to “dislodge,” ultimately compromising “the
administration of justice.”115
Pound’s concern for the administration of justice, coupled with his
reluctance to push too far in the social science direction, came from at
least two sources. One, interestingly, was the rise of Stalinism in Russia, a
political development that led him to fear that abandoning the case method
might actually increase the chances of America becoming an authoritarian
state.116 Just as Herbert Wechsler believed that the case method fostered
private-minded attorneys who prized private, laissez-faire ordering over
public law, Pound came to believe the opposite: abandoning the case
method risked creating statist attorneys who ignored private interests in
favor of big government. “In the Soviet polity,” noted Pound in 1952,
“punitive justice has been substantially taken away from the courts and
made a matter of administrative action.”117 Something similar, he
believed, could happen in the United States, particularly if “advocates,
prosecutors, and judges are not well trained in the law.”118 Implying that
students who learned from Wechsler and Michael’s approach were not
“well trained in the law,” Pound went on to argue that students not
inculcated in the common law tradition “may well turn us from the
traditional judicial path of the common law into the administrative
path.”119 Such a development, feared Pound, would place the United
States “on the road to absolute government.”120
Pound’s comments suggest, remarkably, that Stalinism raised questions
about American legal education.121 Of course, neither Herbert Wechsler
nor Jerome Michael were Stalinists, nor did they believe that abandoning
the common law would lead to authoritarianism. Yet, Pound’s fear that
their emphasis on administration detracted from the common law’s
traditional aversion to statism was not completely unreasonable. As
outlandish as Pound’s concerns seemed, even Wechsler and Michael
would probably have agreed that America’s adherence to the common law
had empowered the private sector, making it capable not only of
withstanding state intrusion but, as the destruction of the First New Deal
suggested, overcoming it. The very same factors that made Wechsler and
Michael New Dealers, in other words, also subjected them to charges of
115
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being unwitting supporters of a tendency towards the kind of
authoritarianism emerging in the U.S.S.R, Eastern Europe, and China.
Whether Pound thought that Wechsler and Michael were protoauthoritarians or not, he had at least one other reason for lobbying against
Wechsler and Michael’s approach to teaching criminal law. Like
Columbia’s administrators in the 1930s, he too recognized that “economic
causes” had led “leaders of the [legal] profession” to look down on careers
spent in the “criminal courts.”122 Pound also realized that “no ambitious
student in a national law school” would actively seek “practice in criminal
cases.” 123 Yet, this left the question open as to students who were not
enrolled in national schools. What were they to do? Rather than waste
their time questioning the common law, Pound believed that students at
less prestigious regional schools should learn how to practice.124 He made
this apparent by agreeing to write an introduction for a casebook
assembled by University of California Los Angeles Law Professor Rollin
M. Perkins in 1952.125
Perkins declared an open concern for the practitioner in his
Preface, rejecting Michael and Wechsler’s approach to criminal law
teaching on the grounds that it did not prepare students for actual
practice.126 Blasting Michael and Wechsler for tailoring their casebook to
students who had “other purposes” for taking criminal law than entering
the criminal bar, Perkins made sure to note in his preface that “the first
need of the lawyer is to know what the law is.”127 “A class made up of
beginning law students,” he continued, “should not be conducted as if it
were a ‘lawyer’s seminar,’” nor should professors use cases as “mere
pegs” on which to hang “general discussions of criminology.”128
Determined not to focus on criminology – or any other type of
social science for that matter – Perkins assembled a casebook that was
classically Bealean. Just as Beale presented students with large numbers
of cases and few outside sources, Perkins did the same. To cover the
broad topic of homicide, he included no less than twenty-five cases and no
subheadings. This meant that students had to determine for themselves
which cases applied to murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide and so
on.129
The UCLA professor also ignored materials that questioned the
common law. Unlike Michael and Wechsler, who had students debating
whether European codes were “wiser” than American ones, or whether
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s theory of increasing punishment for heat-of122
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passion killings improved the common law, Perkins used outside sources
only when he thought it necessary to illustrate black letter rules. For
example, to help students grasp the law of homicide he included in his
appendix an abbreviated version of a law review article that he himself
had written on the distinction between murder and manslaughter.130
Organized much like a legal treatise, the article presented murder,
manslaughter, and partial defenses like provocation in relatively straightforward, uncritical terms. Though the excerpt discussed the provocation
defense, for example, it failed to ask whether defendants acting in the heat
of passion deserved harsher penalties, as Holmes’s piece had; opting
instead to simply classify and explain common law examples of when
provocation applied, cases like battery, mutual combat, trespass, and
adultery.131
Interestingly, even though Perkins adopted a much more
conservative approach than Wechsler and Michael, he still appropriated
what might be called a Wechslerian “look.” Instead of simply entitling his
book Cases on Criminal Law as Beale did, for example, Perkins used the
more suggestive, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, even though
there were few “materials” to be found.132 He also downplayed the
reactionary nature of his text, being sure to mention in his Preface that his
casebook was not a reaction to the social science method so much as a
move toward a “middle position” between Langdell and the social science
approach.133 Of course, this raised an obvious question, why bother
downplaying the text’s aversion to social science? One possibility is that
Perkins wanted to sell copies. By 1952, the year Perkins’s casebook was
published, Michael and Wechsler’s casebook was enjoying widespread
popularity.134 In fact, the authors were considering a second edition when
Michael died in 1953.135
Driving the popularity of Wechsler and Michael’s text was a
convergence of forces that placed social science at the center of criminal
law teaching in the 1950s. Perhaps foremost among these was an
ascendant faith in the ability of science and experts to improve almost all
aspects of human life.136 Though faith in experts impacted law in myriad
ways, one manifestation emerged in calls by legal academics and
professional associations to reform criminal law, a field that had long
suffered from academic and professional “neglect.”137 In 1951, the
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Rockefeller Foundation granted the American Law Institute, or ALI,
money to put toward a model penal code that would revise irrational,
arbitrary aspects of the common law.138 Though the ALI had envisioned
such a code before, rapid developments in “disciplines concerned with
social aspects of behavior,” revitalized interest in the late 1940s and early
1950s.139 Convinced that state legislatures could benefit from new
developments in social science, the ALI hoped to make its criminal code
available to legislatures for possible adoption by the end of the decade.140
To facilitate the MPC’s completion, the ALI asked Herbert
Wechsler, now renowned for his criminal law casebook, to serve as the
chief Reporter for the model penal code project.141 Long interested in
shifting emphasis away from the courts and toward public law solutions,
Wechsler not only took the offer but quickly applied the policy-oriented
approach that he had developed in class to the MPC, incorporating new
discoveries in social science, particularly psychology, to the criminal law
context. To take just a few examples, one initiative that Wechsler
supported was the replacement of common law notions of malice for more
dispassionate classifications of purpose, knowledge, and recklessness.
Another revision that Wechsler supported was the incorporation of social
science studies on human sexuality to decriminalize moral offenses, most
notably adultery.142
Inspired by his work with the ALI, Wechsler began to incorporate
model penal code materials into his teaching, using them to reinforce his
longstanding view that cases were not enough. In 1956, for example,
Wechsler published a supplement to Criminal Law & Its Administration
that included ALI reports on subjects as diverse as robbery, extortion,
theft, mistake of law, and insanity.143 Again and again, the ALI materials
that Wechsler included presented the common law as irrational and
outdated; a message that coincided nicely with Wechsler’s longstanding
goal of undermining student reverence for judicial law-making,
meanwhile casting favorable light on public law solutions. Though the
New Deal played no role in the development of the MPC, the Code’s
emergence only reinforced Wechsler’s ongoing interest in awakening
students to the world of public law.
Interestingly, the fact that most states had begun to codify their
criminal law long before the MPC was even envisioned did not stop
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Wechsler from using the model code to criticize judges.144 Indeed, he
found instances where judicial interpretations of state codes had corrupted
the original intent of those codes, providing him with an opportunity to
show students, again, that they needed to be critical of cases. To take just
one example, Wechsler focused on Pennsylvania’s codification of murder
in 1794, showing how the crime had been intentionally separated by the
state legislature into two degrees for the purposes of reducing the number
of defendants given the death penalty.145 As originally envisioned by the
statute’s drafters, defendants needed to premeditate and deliberate on their
crime in order to be convicted of first-degree murder.146 If they did not
plan their crime in advance but simply acted on impulse or anger, then the
highest charge that they might face was second degree murder.147 While
this move gained widespread attention and praise for its progressive
approach to limiting the death penalty, common law judges quickly began
to confuse the distinction between first and second degree, grouping
crimes where defendants had taken only an instant to deliberate into the
first degree category.148 For Wechsler and the ALI alike, this tendency
warranted a substantial statutory revision, one that eliminated first degree
murder completely.149 According to the Model Penal Code, murder could
be charged wherever an offender killed with “purpose,” regardless of
whether they premeditated or deliberated.150
While the drafting of the MPC provided Wechsler with an
opportunity to bolster his innovative approach to teaching criminal law,
the completion of the MPC in 1962 canonized it. Suddenly, the idea of
teaching criminal law as a common law course, without attention to public
law solutions or policy considerations seemed completely out of step with
real world trends. This became even more true when New York and other
states began substantial revisions of their criminal codes in the early
1960s, ultimately adopting large portions of the MPC.
Though
reactionaries like Rollin Perkins continued to feed students a steady diet of
cases, a younger generation of criminal law teachers emerged who deemphasized case law just as much, if not more than Wechsler, substituting
in their place law review articles, statistical studies, open-ended policy
questions and, of course, the MPC.
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IV. SANFORD H. KADISH AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CASEBOOK
One of the first casebooks to carry the torch lit by Michael and Wechsler
in the 1930s was a text assembled by Monrad G. Paulsen and Sanford H.
Kadish in 1962. Entitled Criminal Law & Its Processes, Paulsen and
Kadish’s casebook represented, as Kadish himself remembered it, a direct
“descendant” of Wechsler and Michael’s Criminal Law and Its
Administration.151
In fact, both Paulsen and Kadish directly
acknowledged “an intellectual indebtedness” to “Professor Herbert
Wechsler of the Columbia Law School,” who in their opinion had “left an
impress upon the teaching and thinking in the criminal law,” that in their
opinion, was both “lasting” and “profound.”152
The link to Wechsler, at least for Kadish, began in law school. Following
World War II, Kadish enrolled at Columbia and took Wechsler’s criminal
law course, a class that he remembered for being “intellectually exciting”
in a way that “other classes were not.”153 Struck by Wechsler’s
“utilitarian,” even “Benthamite” approach to the law, Kadish was
particularly impressed with Wechsler’s tendency to approach the subject
“from a legislative point of view.”154 When Monrad Paulsen approached
Kadish with the idea of assembling a casebook in the late 1950s, Kadish
agreed, eventually drafting the largest section of the text on substantive
criminal law, leaving Paulsen to criminal procedure.155 Though criminal
procedure was originally intended to dominate the book, the “tail wagged
the dog,” as Kadish later remembered it, leaving Paulsen’s section to the
very end; ultimately to be eliminated in subsequent editions.156
In honor of Wechsler, Kadish began his portion of the casebook with a
section on “crime, morals, and personal liberty” that did not include a
single case.157 Eschewing the common law, he immersed his first year
students in the Model Penal Code, the Scottish Home Department’s
“Report on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution,” Lord Justice Devlin’s
lecture on “the Enforcement of Morals,” and an excerpt from H.L.A.
Hart’s article “Immorality and Treason.”158
Knowing full well that
“adultery, fornication, and prostitution” were all still offenses in the
United States, Kadish pushed his students to consider whether such
offenses should be eliminated.159 Regardless of the answer that individual
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students arrived at – either morals offenses should be eliminated or not –
the underlying lesson was clear: criminal law – and perhaps law generally
– was neither immutable nor absolute. It relied not on longstanding
principles culled from common law cases, but policy considerations,
statistical data, and academic studies. Students, once required to kneel at
the arcane oracle of the common law judge, were now asked to be
legislators – and to come up with their own opinions of what the law
should be.
Even when Kadish did include cases, the basic mission of getting students
to think like legislators did not change. For example, to explain the
distinction between first and second-degree murder, Kadish asked his
students to read only one case from Utah where the common law judge
lamented the fact that the distinction between first and second degree
murder was meaningless.160 “It is true,” noted the judge, “that quite a
number of courts” had approved jury instructions allowing jurors to find
premeditation even though there was “no appreciable space of time
between the intention to kill and the act of killing.”161 Convinced that this
trend was bad, the judge nevertheless held that jurors should be allowed to
find premeditation so long as the defendant developed a “fixed design or
purpose” in a “space of time” no matter how “brief.”162 For students
assigned to brief the case, the legal rule was both clear and ridiculous:
some time should be allowed for the development of premeditation, yet no
time was actually needed to premeditate a murder. Rather than use the
opinion to present one piece of a larger puzzle, like Perkins’s twenty-five
cases on homicide, Kadish used one case to present the whole puzzle, then
revealed it to be a travesty of justice.
The approach won instant praise. In a 1964 edition of the Harvard Law
Review, Stanford University Law Professor Herbert L. Packer commended
Kadish for assembling “the best conventional teaching book” in what was
otherwise a “grimy” field of law usually reserved for the “most disfavored
segment of the bar.”163 In particular, Packer praised Kadish’s beginning
chapters on legislative choice, legality, and sentencing, all of which
boasted “relatively little reliance on case material.”164 Rather than decry
the absence of specific offenses like kidnapping, arson, and robbery,
Packer rejoiced that “the dreary round of differential definitions” which
formed the most “conspicuous feature” of many criminal law courses was
gone, leaving professors obligated to only instruct their students in two
crimes, homicide and theft.165 In a laudatory mood, Packer declared that
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Paulsen and Kadish’s casebook represented the “only reasonable
alternative” to Michael and Wechsler’s text “now available.”166
Packer’s review indicates that Michael and Wechsler’s text was still
something of a benchmark by which other casebooks were judged even in
the 1960s. Though condescending in his attitude towards criminal
practice, nothing new among law scholars, Packer clearly believed that
Michael and Wechsler had elevated the subject’s intellectual status. In
fact, he even dated the “arrival” of “full intellectual respectability” to
criminal law with the publication of their textbook in 1940, over twenty
years earlier.167 Yet, Michael and Wechsler’s book had never gone
through a second edition and sorely needed an overhaul. For example, the
text did not take into consideration the recent completion of the Model
Penal Code in 1962 nor did it address the increasing criticism of morals
offenses like adultery and fornication in the academic literature and press
nationwide.168
Kadish and Paulsen addressed both subjects directly. Not only did their
first chapter focus on the policy behind punishing morals offenses, but
they included substantial portions of the MPC commentaries in their
text.169 This emphasis on the MPC carried through the entire substantive
criminal law portion of the book, providing students with a timely
counterpoint to common law doctrine.170 As the 1960s progressed, such a
counterpoint to the common law proved more and more relevant as states
began adopting portions of the MPC, including New York, which enlisted
Herbert Wechsler himself to serve on a temporary commission to revise
the state’s criminal law in 1961.171
By 1969, interest in the MPC and, by extension, Criminal Law & Its
Processes was so high that Paulsen and Kadish put together a second
edition. In this version, they continued to use cases as pegs upon which to
hang discussions of criminology, criminal law theory, and ethics. For
example, they included one case on narcotics possession to push students
to consider whether users who suffer addiction should be punished.172
They also added material culled from the civil rights movement in the
American South, including a case from South Carolina where the U.S.
Supreme Court had declared that the state’s segregation statutes did not
grant black sit-in demonstrators “fair warning” to stay out of white
166
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restaurants.173 Given that Jim Crow had banned African Americans from
white restaurants for fifty years, the ruling was hard to square with
reality.174 Yet, by showing how the Supreme Court manipulated the law
to protect black demonstrators, the case underscored law’s plasticity,
pushing students to consider normative goals over interpretive rules.175
Though times had changed considerably since the 1930s, Kadish and
Paulsen continued down Wechsler’s road in the 1960s away from the case
method and towards a more open-ended inquiry into why the law existed
as it did. The advent of the Model Penal Code fueled this approach, as did
the political climate of the 1960s.176 Questions of racial justice, police
brutality, and the arbitrary definition of crime all became issues of real
concern thanks to the civil rights movement in the South, urban riots in the
North, and rising crime nationally.177 Yet, unlike the 1930s, the 1960s did
not push criminal law scholars to develop a new approach to teaching so
much as build on the approach that Wechsler and Michael had already
devised.178
That approach continued to thrive through the end of the Twentieth
Century. From 1962 to 1975, Criminal Law & Its Processes went through
three editions.179 By the turn-of the-century it had gone through six.180 In
2007, it emerged in its eighth revised form, with Stephen J. Schulhofer
and Carol S. Steiker replacing Monrad Paulsen.181 Processes even
inspired disciples, most notably Joshua Dressler, who designated his own
casebook, first published in 1994, a “son of Kadish.”182
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Even scholars who did not directly credit Wechsler or Kadish built on
their basic model, providing students with a relatively small number of
carefully selected cases along with a rich assortment of notes, questions,
and outside sources. In 1969, for example, Harvard professor Lloyd L.
Weinreb published a casebook that separated criminal law from criminal
procedure, a move that other authors would quickly make, but then
retained the model developed by Wechsler and Kadish for his substantive
criminal law portion.183 He began with three chapters on the general and
special parts of criminal law, including a limited number of cases along
with notes, commentary, newspaper excerpts, and law review citations,
and then concluded with a Wechslerian chapter on “Crime and
Punishment” that incorporated what one reviewer called an “unusual
mélange” of materials.184 The materials included “quotations from
classics in philosophy,” excerpts from sentencing reports, and portions of
a debate between H.L.A. Hart, John Stuart Mill, and James Fitzjames
Stephen.185 Though ordered differently than Kadish’s introductory
chapters, Weinreb’s inclusion of outside sources as well as philosophical
and criminological materials nevertheless represented an obvious variation
of Wechsler’s approach. Wienreb himself explained that he wanted his
students to consider the “moral, political, and social issues” surrounding
criminal law, not just the rules.186
Four years later, in 1973, George E. Dix and M. Michael Sharlot, both of
the University of Texas, continued the Wechslerian tradition with
Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, which began with an excerpt from
“The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” a report on rising crime rates
put together by Lyndon Johnson’s special commission on law enforcement
and criminal justice.187 The text continued with sections on the
criminalization of alcohol intoxication, pulling together excerpts from
scholarly treatises, statistical studies, and “criminal histories of
alcoholics.”188 Throughout, the casebook aimed to be “more than a
vehicle” for students to learn “the law of crimes,” shooting instead to
“facilitate inquiry” into the “broadest issues” of the “relationship of the
individual to the state.”189
Without describing each subsequent casebook to emerge since 1973,
suffice it to say that no new approaches to teaching criminal law arose in
the Twentieth Century.190 Though different authors stressed different
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areas, the general method remained the same.191 Cases remained central,
but were fewer in number and more heavily supplemented by outside
materials than during Beale’s time.192
Normative questions also
frequently followed cases, pushing students to think critically about why
the law was as it was, and whether it should be changed.193
So far, Wechsler’s model has survived into the Twenty-First Century, with
perhaps one exception.194 Paul Robinson, on the faculty at Pennsylvania,
substantially altered the casebook format in 2005 by beginning each
section with a crime scenario followed by extensive statutory materials
and only brief case excerpts.195 Following each scenario, Robinson asked
students to behave as practitioners and determine “what liability, if any”
existed under the prevailing law.196 At first glance, this method marks an
interesting turn towards a more practitioner-oriented approach, one that
pushes students to evaluate facts as if they were prosecutors. Yet, even
Robinson includes a Wechslerian twist. After each problem, he locates a
“discussion materials” section that includes excerpts from law reviews,
academic studies and so on, providing law teachers with the option of
finishing topics on a normative, policy-oriented note.197 Assuming that
discussion sections are assigned, Robinson’s text is the least case-friendly
to have been compiled yet, marking in certain ways the culmination of
Wechsler’s revolt against the case method.198
This raises a question of cause and effect. While it is undoubtedly true
that Wechsler viewed the addition of non-case materials to be a rebellion
against the case method in the 1930s, could the same be said of scholars
who came after him?199 Is it not possible that they might have moved
away from the method on their own, independent of Wechsler’s influence?
Perhaps: even if Wechsler had never joined Jerome Michael in the
compilation of a criminal law casebook in 1940, for example, the
completion of the Model Penal Code in 1962, which Wechsler directed,
essentially transformed the field so dramatically that even the most
unreconstructed adherents to Langdell’s method, Rollin Perkins being
perhaps the best example, ultimately had to concede the “dominance” of
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statutory materials to the study of criminal law by the end of the
century.200
Yet, just because statutes became a bigger part of the criminal law does
not mean that casebooks necessarily had to follow Wechsler’s model to
the extent that they did. For example, it could have been possible for
scholars to do what Paul Robinson has done, namely include statutory
materials side by side with cases, without any additional discussion
section pushing students to reflect on why the law says what it does. One
thing that Wechsler contributed to the field was a particular “perspective,”
to borrow from Kadish, not so much of a lawyer but a type of hypothetical
legislator, interested in both normative and intellectual questions of ethics,
science, sociology, and politics.201

V. CONCLUSION
While most criminal law scholars would probably not attribute the
structure of their casebooks to Herbert Wechsler, they could. Beginning
in the 1930s, Wechsler intentionally transformed the manner in which
criminal law casebooks were organized, reducing cases in favor of
supplementary materials culled from philosophy, criminology, and other
disciplines. The result not only proved popular, but helped elevate the
status of a course that many scorned for being associated with a
professionally undesirable, disreputable field. By the 1960s, Wechsler’s
model had become the dominant format for criminal law casebooks, and
criminal law courses, in the United States.
That dominance continues today. Precisely for this reason, it is worth
recovering the history behind why Wechsler organized his course in the
way that he did. For example, much of Wechsler’s innovation was made
possible by the fact that elite law schools like Columbia were not
interested in training criminal lawyers. This freed Wechsler to innovate in
a way that professors who taught contracts, property, and commercial law
could not.202 It also transformed the mission of the course, if you will,
nudging it away from practical training to policy considerations and
ethics. While Columbia initially thought that this would better train
administrative attorneys and policy analysts for Roosevelt’s New Deal,
Wechsler’s innovation proved permanent. Two decades after the
publication of his casebook in 1940, Wechsler’s approach was fast
defining the field, transforming criminal law from a skills course to what
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Sanford Kadish remembers as an attempt to produce “good, sensitive,
aware, socially conscious,” citizens.203
That law schools should strive to produce better citizens is hard to refute.
However, the Carnegie Foundation’s recent recommendation that law
school education return to an emphasis on legal practice raises questions
about the possible tension between skills and ethics.204 For example, do
law schools still view criminal practice to be undesirable? If so, then
perhaps Wechsler’s innovations should remain in place, regardless of the
Carnegie report. Then again, what if schools decide to get more serious
about training criminal law practitioners? Do they not sacrifice some
amount of practical training by pursuing Wechsler’s approach? What
good are ethics, philosophy, and sociology if graduating students do not
know the law?
Of course, scholars might argue that Wechsler’s approach is unavoidable
given the dramatic rise in codification over the course of the past four
decades. Yet, even a brief glimpse at the history of the criminal law
course suggests that codification was not what inspired Wechsler to
change his approach. He rejected the case method for political reasons,
blaming the method for inculcating a narrow view of the law that
contributed to the Supreme Court’s destruction of the first New Deal.
This explains why he moved towards normative questions in his notes. He
did not simply want students to be able to analyze and interpret statutes;
he wanted them to question the law, and to recognize its relationship to
society. If Wechsler had not felt anger at the case method, it is entirely
possible that a criminal law textbook would have evolved, like Robinson’s
evolved, which merged statutes and cases in a problem-oriented fashion.
Recovering the political motivations behind Wechsler’s anti-case
method raises questions about the political implications of legal education
generally. To take just one example, Duncan Kennedy’s now legendary
attack on legal education as a “reproduction of hierarchy” fails to
recognize that Wechsler and Michael’s approach to criminal law sought to
reproduce a very different type of hierarchy than the one Langdell had
originally intended in 1870.205 Rather than engender a reverence for
judicial precedent and the private ordering of economic affairs, as
Langdell had sought, Wechsler and Michael aimed to instill a respect for
public ordering and governmental intervention in private matters, in line
with Roosevelt’s statist New Deal.206 The success of their approach,
which coincided with realist calls for reform at Yale in the 1930s, hints at
a larger thesis: not only did the New Deal usher in the decline of Lochner-
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era jurisprudence, but it hastened the demise of Lochner-era lawyers.207
Out of our nation’s greatest economic crisis came a push to create a new
kind of attorney, one who believed that society’s most pressing problems
were best solved by public, not private law.208
Even if Wechsler and Michael’s antipathy to private law did not
transform the American lawyer, criminal law remains the only first year
course to represent an open revolt against the case method. This means
that at a basic pedagogical level, criminal law does not necessarily teach
the things that the method teaches, including legal reasoning, deductive
analysis, or how to think like a lawyer. In fact, criminal law might be
teaching students how not to think like lawyers. This, after all, was
Wechsler’s intention. Lawyers, in his opinion, had blindly endorsed legal
fictions like substantive due process and liberty of contract at the expense
of the nation, driving it to economic ruin. What needed to happen, in his
opinion, was an explosion of this “closed-system,” in favor of a much
more critical mode of analysis.209
Whether law schools should be in the business of teaching such
analysis is worth reconsidering, if for no other reason than to justify
current practice in the face of mounting doubt. For example, one could
easily read the Carnegie Report and argue that the battles that Wechsler
was fighting in the 1930s are over. No longer do common law courses
dominate law school.
Administrative law, contracts, commercial
transactions, and tax all push students to deal with statutory materials as
well as judicial opinions. Further, the Model Penal Code is not only an
established part of the criminal law in most states, but it is over half a
century old and has begun to produce its own body of common law
interpreting it. Though it may be too early to say that we have entered a
new common law era, it is certainly true that the MPC has taken on a life
of its own as states have adopted portions of it and modified others to meet
particularized, local needs. Are students who have undergone Wechsler’s
207
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method prepared to deal with those needs? Can they perform the kind of
case analysis that is currently needed to find legal answers? And can law
schools, particularly regional schools, continue to afford to adopt the elite
mentality that criminal law is not a worthy profession?
While such questions may not strike criminal law teachers as particularly
important, recovering Wechsler’s revolt against Langdell sheds light on
how at least one law school course moved away from a practitioner’s
perspective. Recovering this process for other courses may be the next
step towards explaining why the Carnegie Foundation discovered the
problems that it did, setting the stage for more widespread curricular
reform. Or, recovering Wechsler may do something else entirely: it may
help law school administrators counter the Carnegie findings with a larger
vision of what legal education, ultimately, should be about.
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